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Abstract
We discuss the use of elliptic curves in cryptography on high-dimensional surfaces.
In particular, instead of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol written in the form
of a bi-dimensional row, where the elements are made up with 256 bits, we propose
a key exchange protocol given in a matrix form, with four independent entries each
of them constructed with 64 bits. Apart from the great advantage of significantly
reducing the number of used bits, this methodology appears to be immune to attacks
of the style of Western, Miller, and Adleman, and at the same time it is also able to
reach the same level of security as the cryptographic system presently obtained by
the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. A nonlinear differential equation (NDE)
admitting the elliptic curves as a special case is also proposed. The study of the
class of solutions of this NDE is in progress.
Keywords: Elliptic-curve cryptography, Elliptic-curve discrete log problem, Public
key cryptography, Nonlinear differential equations.
1 Introduction
As known, encryption is the conversion of electronic data into another form, called
ciphertext, which cannot be easily understood by anyone except authorized parties.
The primary purpose of encryption is to protect the confidentiality of digital data
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stored on computer systems or transmitted via the Internet or other computer
networks. Encryption algorithms can provide not only confidentiality, but also
authentication (i.e., the origin message is verified), integrity (i.e., the contents of
the message have not been changed), and non-repudiation (i.e., the sender cannot
deny to be the author of the message) [1, 2]. Elliptic curves are more an more used in
cryptography [3, 4]. Their main advantage is that shorter encryption keys use fewer
memory and CPU resources for achieving the sam level of security than traditional
methods [5] . The main concept behind this is the use of the so-called one-way
functions. A one-way function is a function for which it is relatively easy to compute
the image of some elements in the domain but it is extremely difficult to reverse
this process and determine the original element solely based on the given image [6].
More precisely, according to the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [7],
the recommended security parameters for elliptic curves is 256 bits (standards for
the years 2017-2021). However, to manipulate data with this degree of security is
computationally expensive and often impossible on embedded systems. At present
many industrial systems adopt (much) less secure methodologies. This necessitates
a re-evaluation of our cryptographic strategy. The question is: are we able to obtain
the same degree of security with small embedded microprocessors managing only
64-bit operations? The solution of this problem entails several steps:
A) First step: Research
The solution of this problem requires new mathematical concepts and algorithms.
B) Second step: Commercialization
Once found the solution, the process is concluded with the start-up of the commer-
cialization of the product.
This manuscript deals only with the first step. We shall introduce a hyper-surface in
an arbitrary (n2+1)-dimensional space (with n denoting a positive integer number),
and we use the idea of the one-way function possessing also the property of being
a trap function. The encrypted shared-key, instead to be written as a (very large)
scalar number is brought into a matrix form. We shall prove that we may obtain the
same degree of security as the one obtained by the Microsoft Digital Rights Man-
agement [8] by sending an encrypted shared-matrix with four independent entries,
each of them made up by 64 bits. The encrypted information is successively trans-
mitted through elliptic curves obtained by projecting the hyper-surface imbedded
in a (n2+1)-dimensional space onto perpendicular planes. This methodology allows
reaching the same level of security as the cryptographic system presently obtained
by the Microsoft Digital Rights Management.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Section (2) we introduce high-dimensional
surfaces cryptography (HDSC) and the elliptic curves constructed through these
hyper-surfaces. Without loss of generality, we shall limit ourselves to the case of
n = 2 (i.e., to a 5D-space). The generalization to (n2 + 1)-dimensional space is
straightforward. The definition of the groups in elliptic curves on high-dimensional
surfaces and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be found in the Subsec-
tions (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. Concluding remarks are reported in the Sec-
tion (4).
2 Elliptic-Curves Cryptography on High Di-
mensional Surfaces
We illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-dimensional elliptic curve, even
though the procedure is straightforwardly generalizable to elliptic curves on surfaces
imbedded in an arbitrary (n2 + 1)-dimensional space, with n denoting a positive
integer number (the reason for which only spaces of such dimension are allowed
will soon be clear). For the sake of simplicity, in this work we shall limit ourselves
to the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-dimensional surfaces. The generalization to
the general case (i.e., to the case of elliptic curves on (n2 + 1)-hyper-surface) is
straightforward1. In a 5-dimensional space, the surfaces on which the elliptic curves
are defined, are the solutions of the equation
E =
{
(y, x1, x2, x3, x4) | y2 = x31 + x32 + x33 + x34 +A ·X+ b
}
where (1)
A ≡ (a1, a2, a3, a4) ; X ≡

x1
x2
x3
x4

with ai (i = 1, · · · , 4) and b denoting elements of the field K. Examples of fields K
are the Real Numbers, R, the Rational Numbers, Q, the Complex Numbers, C or
the Integers modulo p, Z/pZ. By fixing three of the four variables xi (by setting, for
example, x2 = c2 = const., x3 = c3 = const. and x4 = c4 = const.) and by rotating
the indexes, Eq. (1) defines together with the points at infinity O, four distinguished
two-dimensional elliptic curves Ei:
Ei =
{
(y, xi) | y2 = x3i + aixi + bi
}
∪ {O} with i = (1, · · · , 4) and (2)
b1 ≡ b+ c32 + c33 + c34 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4
b2 ≡ b+ c31 + c33 + c34 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4
b3 ≡ b+ c31 + c32 + c34 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4
b4 ≡ b+ c31 + c32 + c33 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3
being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) elements of K. In order to avoid degeneracy, these parameters
are subject to the following restrictions
4a31 + 27(b+ c
3
2 + c
3
3 + c
3
4 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4)
2 6= 0 (3)
4a32 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
3 + c
3
4 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
4a33 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
2 + c
3
4 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
4a34 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
2 + c
3
3 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3)
2 6= 0
Clearly, in case ofK = Z/pZ, we may associate four modules p to each elliptic curves.
As we shall see in the forthcoming section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of
dimension n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are acceptable
1In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involves only square matrices of order n×n - see next
Section.
since the shared-key involves only square matrices of order n × n. For illustration
purpose only, Figure 1 shows a three dimensional surface where the values of the
parameters are a1 = −4, a2 = −5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to the elliptic
curves obtained by projecting the surface 1 onto the planes x1 = 1 and x2 = −2,
respectively.
Figure 1: Only for illustration purpose, we show the two-dimensional surface given by
Eq. (2) with parameters a1 = −4, a2 = −5 and b = 3.5. However, one should bear in
mind that only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension n2 + 1 have real meaning
(hence, only elliptic curves constructed by hyper-surfaces of dimensions 2, 5, 10 and so on,
are acceptable). This because, as we shall see in the forthcoming section, the encrypted
code involves only square matrices of order n× n.
2.1 Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Sur-
faces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addition an abelian group.
For each Pi ∈ Ei, Qi ∈ Ei and Ri ∈ Ei the following properties are satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O + Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi − Pi = Pi + (−Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) +Ri;
• Closed : If Pi ∈ Ei and Qi ∈ Ei, then Pi +Qi ∈ Ei;
Each group identified by Ei is equipped with the standard group operations [9, 10],
i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) ∈ Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) ∈ Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri
Figure 2: Elliptic curve obtained by
projecting the surface 1 onto the plane
x1 = 1.
Figure 3: Elliptic curve obtained by project-
ing the surface 1 onto the plane x2 = −2.
[with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i − (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi −Rixi)− Piy
si =
Piy −Qiy
Pixi −Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
2Pixi = s
2
i − 2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi −Rixi)− Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infinity are reached in each elliptic curves Ei when
Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P ∈ Ei and κ ∈ Z, Eq. (5) allows defining the operation
Q = κP under the condition that the operation Q = κP ≡ P + · · · + P , equal κ
times P , is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q ∈ Ei. The scalar
multiplication defines the one-way function Q→ P where is very difficult to extract
the value of κ.
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the
inverse of Pi is −Pi = (Pixi ,−Piy) satisfying the relation Pi − Pi = O.
2.2 High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Prob-
lem
For each Ei the scalar multiplication defines a one way-function [11]. Let us consider
elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et Q1 and P1 two
points belonging to the same elliptic curve, say E1, with the condition that Q1 is
a multiple of P1. As know, to find the value of the number κ such that Q1 = κP1
is a very difficult problem [12]. We introduce now the first base point (Generator),
G1 ≡ (Gx1 , Gy) ∈ E1(Z/p1Z). Since the group is closed, G1 generates a cyclic group
under point addition in the curve E1. The order n1 (with n1 ∈ K) of G1 is the
number of the points in the group that G1 generates. By this operation, we say
that G1 generates a subgroup of size n, and we write ord(G1) = n1. The order of
the subgroup generated by G1 is the smallest integer κ1 such that κ1G1 = O (hence,
n1 < κ1).
After n1 iterations on the curve E1 we find a second base point (Generator), G2
with coordinates G2(n1) = [Gx2(n1), Gy2(n1)]. We may keep this second generator
to perform n2 iterations on the curve E2, with n2 < κ2 being κ2 the order of the
subgroup generated by G2 on the elliptic curve E2. After n2 iterations we get a third
base point (Generator), G3 with coordinates G3(n2) = [Gx3(n2), Gy3(n2)]. With this
second generator we perform n3 iterations on the curve E3, with n3 < κ3 (with κ”
denoting the order of the subgroup generated by G3 on the elliptic curve E3). After
n3 iterations on the curve E3 we get the fourth base point (Generator), G4 with
coordinates G4(n3) = [Gx4(n3), Gy4(n3)]. The process concludes after n4 iterations
on the elliptic curves E4 (with n4 less than κ4, the order of the subgroup generated
by G3 on the curve E4). At the end of these operations we get three matrices N , G
and K, of order 2 × 2, where the entries are totally independent from each others.
Matrices N and G reads2
N =
(
n1 n2
n3 n4
)
; G =
(
Gx1 Gx2(n1)
Gx3(n2) Gx4(n3)
)
; K =
(
κ1 κ2
κ3 κ4
)
(6)
The parameters that also Eve, the eavesdropper, possesses are (pi, ai, bi, G,K) with
i = (1, · · · , 4). pi specify the modulo of the fields Ki, ai and bi define the elliptic
curves Ei (notice that in general these curves are different from each others), G is the
Generator matrix and K is the order of the subgroups generated by G, respectively.
Now, if Bob and Alice want to communicate with each other, Bob picks private key
N with 1 ≤ ni ≤ κi − 1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Bob computes matrix T = NG, which
belongs to the curves E [given by Eq. (1)]. At the same time, Alice picks private
key M
M =
(
m1 m2
m3 m4
)
(7)
where the entries mi satisfy the conditions 1 ≤ mi ≤ κi − 1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Alice
receives from Bob the information T and she generates the point MT = MGN = W
(notice that matrices do not commute). Bob receives from Alice the information
P = MG and he computes PN = MGN = W 3. Both players, Bob and Alice,
possess the same (encrypted) key W , which also belongs to the curve E [given by
Eq. (1)]. Eve, the eavesdropper, sees both information T and P , but he is unable
to retrieve the sheared-key W . Figure 4 depicts the entire process.
• Eve does not know to which entry of the matrix G the generators have been
assigned;
• In case of 5D-elliptic curves, the process runs on four, distinguished and inde-
pendent, 2D-elliptic curves and the encrypted key belongs to a 5D-surface. This
2Note that, once generated, the elements Gx1 , Gxi(ni) may be allocated as entries of the matrix G in
a random way.
3Note that Bob multiplies matrices by placing N always on the right, while Alice multiplies matrices
by placing M always on the left.
Figure 4: Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [13] in high-dimensional elliptic curves
cryptography. Bob and Alice exchange the encryption key in a matrix form, W = MGN ,
having four independent entries each of them constructed with 64 bits. Eve, the eaves-
dropper, may see T = GN and P = MG, but he is unable to decrypt the sheared
Bob-Alice’s key W since it is very difficult to reverse the process and determine what was
the original information.
hyper-surface is constructed in such a way that the curves with variables xi, ob-
tained by setting constant the remaining variables of this hyper-surface (i.e., by
setting xj = const. with j 6= i), are elliptic curves;
• The level of security remains unchanged. Indeed, it is easily to convince ourselves
that to obtain the same level of security as in case of one-dimensional elliptic curve
cryptography (which requires 256 bits), we need to encode the shared-key with only
64 bits elements (since in our case, for a shared-key written in the form of a matrix
2 × 2 the level of security is of the order of α4, with α denoting the number of
required bits).
We recall that the present methodology applies to elliptic curves cryptography con-
structed on hyper-surfaces of dimension n2 +1 (with n denoting an integer number)
because the shared-key is brought into the form of n × n square matrices. Hence,
a surface like Eq. (1) is the immediate generalization of a one-dimensional elliptic
curves cryptography. The subsequent surface which generalizes Eq. (1) should be
imbedded in a ten-dimensional space, and so on.
3 Examples of Practical Uses of High- Dimen-
sional Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The aim of this section is to illustrate the many possibilities and practical usages
opened by the introduction of High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Gen-
erally speaking, HDECC can be applied instead of any use of the classic ECC; i.e.,
Bitcoin, secure shell (ssl), transport layer security (tls) [14]. Among these applica-
tions, one of the most important is certainly tls. Indeed, tls is the new generation of
the Secure Socket Layer (ssl) which is used in any modern telecommunication. For
instance, the well-known https is nothing else than the classic http protocol running
within ssl/tls in order to ensure a secured, bidirectional connection for arbitrary
binary data between two hosts. In order to establish a shared key between these
two hosts, the current implementations of tls mainly relies on the DH or ECDH key
exchange protocols discussed in the previous sections.
However, introducing such security layers comes at the price of overheads in terms
of infrastructure costs, communication latency, data usage, and energy consumption
[15]. Therefore, the first motivation of HDECC is to reduce the cost of security in
many of the today’s state-of-the-art communication technologies. Moreover, reduc-
ing these costs makes the most modern security protocols accessible for embedded
systems and wearable devices. Indeed, by using HDECC, we could reduce the cost
of these protocols by performing operations on data four time shorter than before
by maintaining, at the same time, the same level of security. In addition, HDECC
opens new perspectives on elliptic curve cryptography as we shall discuss in the
next section.
4 Conclusion and Perspectives
We have proposed an encrypted procedure based on the high-dimensional elliptic
curve cryptography, which allows maintaining the same level of security as presently
obtained by the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. The advantages of these
methodology are multiplex.
1) The quite heavy intermediate exponential operations are avoided and the key
exchange protocol is constructed with 64 bits operations instead of 256 bits.
2) We may proceed to the construct of a new generation of cryptographic standards
working with the technology high-dimensional elliptic curves.
3) This methodology opens new perspectives. In fact it is not difficult to derive
a nonlinear differential equation (NDE) admitting the elliptic curves by a special
choice of the parameters and initial conditions. We get
y′′ + α1(x)y−1/2y′′ + α2(x)y−1/2y′ + α3(x)y−3/2y′
2
+ α4(x) = 0 (8)
y(0) = β1 ; y
′(0) = β2
with αi(x) = ai + bix (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and ai, bi, β1, β2 = const.
with ′ denoting the derivative with respect to the variable x. Note that the differ-
ential equation (8) admits as a special solution the Weierstrass equation [16]
y2 + c1xy + c3y = x
3 + c2x
2 + c4x+ c6 (9)
with ci ∈ K. If CharK 6= (2, 3), we can complete before the square and, successively,
the cube, by defining
η = y + (c1x+ c3)/2 ; ξ = x+ (c
2
1 + 4c2)/12 (10)
By substituting Eqs (10) into Eq. (9), we get the elliptic curve [17]:
η2 = ξ3 − d4
48
ξ − d6
864
(11)
where
d4 = (c
2
1 + 4c2)
2 − 24(c1c3 + 2c4)
d6 = −(c21 + 4c2)3 + 36(c21 + 4c2)(c1c3 + 2c4)− 216(c23 + 4c6) (12)
Clearly, now the question is: how can we determine the largest class of parameters
ai, bi, β1 and β2, introduced in (8), such that the NDE (8) admits (only) a class
of one-way functions, possessing the property of being trap functions ? In addition,
we should also be able to define on these curves a group under point addition. Suc-
cessively, the trapped curves could be identified uniquely by indexes. Being able to
answer to this question would allow encrypting not only the key exchange protocol
but also the trapped-curves on which the generator and the encrypted keys belong.
However, all of this requires sophisticated mathematical tools and it will be subject
of future works.
We close this Section by mentioning other two relevant perspectives of this work.
i) It is quite evident that the formalism illustrated in this manuscript allows intro-
ducing two operations: matrix addition and scalar matrix multiplication (including
the so-called matrix doubling operation). These operations can be used to imple-
ment a high-dimensional version of algorithms such as the ECDSA (elliptic curves
digital signature algorithm) [18].
ii) It is possible to introduce an operator L which connects two distinct points G(1),
G(2) on the high-dimensional surface E [see Eq. (1)] as follows
G(1) = LG(2) =⇒
(
G
(1)
x1 G
(1)
x2 (n1)
G
(1)
x3 (n2) G
(1)
x4 (n3)
)
= L
(
G
(2)
x1 G
(2)
x2 (n4)
G
(2)
x3 (n5) G
(2)
x4 (n6)
)
(13)
with L denoting a non-singular 2× 2 matrix, satisfying the group law under matrix
multiplication. The analytic expression and the mathematical study of this matrix
(and the n×n matrices, in general), with its potential application in cryptography,
will be subject of a future work.
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